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Abstract—One of the biggest challenges for self-driving road
vehicles is how to argue that their safety cases are complete.
The operational design domain (ODD) of the automated driving
system (ADS) can be used to restrict where the ADS is valid and
thus confine the scope of the safety case as well as the verification.
To complete the safety case there is a need to ensure that the ADS
will not exit its ODD. We present four generic strategies to ensure
this. Use cases (UCs) provide a convenient way providing such a
strategy for a collection of operating conditions (OCs) and further
ensures that the ODD allows for operation within the real world.
A framework to categorise the OCs of a UC is presented and it
is suggested that the ODD is written with this structure in mind
to facilitate mapping towards potential UCs. The ODD defines
the functional boundary of the system and modelling it with this
structure makes it modular and generalisable across different
potential UCs. Further, using the ODD to connect the ADS to
the UC enables the continuous delivery of the ADS feature. Two
examples of dimensions of the ODD are given and a strategy to
avoid an ODD exit is proposed in the respective case.
Index Terms—ADS, automated driving system, functional
safety, ODD, operational design domain
I. INTRODUCTION
Automated driving systems (ADS) show great potential to
disrupt the transport industry and change the way we travel
drastically. One of the remaining challenges in realising this
potential is to show that the ADSs are sufficiently safe to be
released on public roads. If not done adequately it would incur
an unreasonable risk of serious loss events, including fatalities.
It is not feasible to prove that the ADS is sufficiently safe pre-
deployment by driving on public roads. Even a fleet of 100
cars would have to be driven continuously for five centuries to
accumulate enough exposure hours to prove the ADS is safer
than human drivers when it comes to fatalities [1]. Instead,
the focus should be on minimising the residual risk that is
This research has been supported by Vinnova via the project ESPLANADE
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left when launching the ADS. The entire process of ensuring
sufficient safety of the ADS is discussed in Sec. II.
Within the automotive industry, it has been agreed that
following the processes outlined in ISO 26262 [2] yields a
system of sufficient functional safety. However, this standard
was conceived with traditional automotive systems in mind,
where the driver with a certain probability is able to com-
pensate for a failure that emanates from within the computer
system. The key process is still valid for developing an ADS,
but two of the main tasks of ISO 26262, namely showing
completeness of the hazard analysis and risk assessment
(HARA) as well as the completeness of the verification, turns
out to be significantly more difficult for an ADS compared to
a traditional automotive system. One reason for this difficulty
being that an ADS, in order to achieve an SAE automation
level 3-5 [3], tends to require a complex set of interwoven
functions and sub-systems to perform the dynamic driving task
(DDT) on its own. A second reason being that the ADS needs
to cope with the complete uncertainty of its environment.
Traditional automotive systems have an implicit operational
design domain (ODD) (everything that it can be exposed to
on the road), but for an ADS the ODD can be used to confine
the content of the HARA and subsequently the scope of the
verification. An efficient format and content of the ODD can
thus support showing completeness of the HARA as well as
limiting the required verification.
A. An Example ADS
Assume we are tasked with developing an ADS that is able
to drive autonomously between the cities of Gothenburg and
Malmo¨ in Sweden with a maximum speed of 110 km/h. It is
restricted to only operate on the E6 motorway and can only
be active during daytime between April and October and in
dry weather (< 1mm rain per hour). This information gives
a quite good indication of what needs to be handled by the
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ADS, but it does not directly help in the development process.
Almost all the relevant information is not explicitly stated,
and it will require an elaborate process to go from this list
of information to one that can be connected to the HARA
and the requirements of the ADS. It is crucial to conduct this
process in order to get a set of requirements on the ADS that
is possible to verify.
One explicitly stated dimension is the speed limit. This is
easy to design for and it is easy to connect to a technical
requirement. The restriction to spring-autumn gives us some
additional information. It tells us that we most likely do not
need to handle snow and probably only on really rare cases
temperatures will reach below zero degrees Celsius. But we
are not sure if this needs to be within the capabilities of
the ADS or not. There are probably a few good reasons for
imposing this restriction in the first place, all of which take into
account the customer value and the ease of implementation and
design. However, these reasons are wrapped up in a ”use case-
statement”, like the one in the first paragraph of this section,
that is easy for the customer and business side to understand,
but which obscures the impact to the design. The limitation
of rain is likely one of those examples. It is not the rain itself
that is the problem to the development of the ADS, but the
loss of sight and reduction of friction on the road.
Similarly, the daytime restriction is probably there to ensure
that there is enough illumination, but this is not what we have
to account for. There is still the rare event of eclipses. Do
we have to handle those? Or are they outside of the scope
even if they occur during daytime? Additionally, what does it
mean to be restricted to the E6 motorway between these two
cities? Are there barriers present? What are the speed limits?
What curvatures and banking can we expect? These roadway
characteristics are fairly straight forward to determine and
model, as they are static (except for repairs and road works).
We just need to go for a drive on this stretch of road and note
down the interesting details. However, what details should we
note down? We do not know what to design for without the
notes and we also do not know what will be important for us
during the design process. We might realise that other aspects
entirely would impact the ADS or facilitate the design process.
The largest implicit category of dimensions in this ”use
case-statement” is the traffic behaviour. We know that the
driving should adhere to Swedish law, but there are many more
nuances to traffic behaviour. Furthermore, traffic behaviour can
be modelled with probabilistic methods. For example, it is
unlikely that we encounter pedestrians on the E6 motorway,
although it is not impossible. Without considering these nu-
ances we will end up with an ADS which will either have
unnecessarily large or (worse) insufficient safety margins. The
unreasonably large safety margins would occur if we place
too much weight on accounting for the ”worst cases” when in
reality they are extremely unlikely. Places along the road that
lie far from areas trafficked by pedestrians and which rarely
see vehicles at standstill will have a very low occurrence of
pedestrians. On the other hand, the insufficient safety margins
might be because, on other parts of the road, cars break down
often and thus pedestrians appear frequently there. Both cases
are difficult to estimate without data.
The examples above show the need for a process to classify
and quantify the operating conditions (OCs) of the ADS such
that what is imposed by the UCs match with what is possible
to implement and verify in the ADS. In this paper, we propose
to use the ODD to model and collect these conditions to make
them explicit and to ensure that they confine what is required
from the UC. That said, the ODD should still be refined
throughout the development process, as visualised in Fig. 3.1
in [4]. However, clarifying the OCs early in the development
phase will greatly support achieving a performant and safe
ADS.
B. Contributions and outline
In this paper we discuss how the ODD of the ADS can be
used to define what external and internal OCs that the ADS
needs to handle and subsequently what it should be designed
and verified for. Each such OC is associated with at least one
of four presented strategies to ensure that the ADS does not
experience an ODD exit during operations. It is acknowledged
that UCs constitute prominent and useful examples of the
spatial and temporal strategy to ensure the ADS remains in its
ODD for collections of OCs. Further, we present a framework
to enable mapping between the ODD and a UC and suggest
that writing the ODD on this format facilitates the comparison
to different UCs.
One result of viewing the ODD in this way is that instead
of explicitly defining geographic regions within the ODD we
propose that geographic limitations show up in the values of
other OCs or as a potential strategy to ensure that the OCs are
fulfilled. We believe this to be in line with the SAE definition
[3] and it further emphasises the modularity of the ODD. This
modularity supports continuous deployment and continuous
delivery of the ADS feature, as well as handling product
portfolios containing a large number of product variants.
Each strategy to avoid ODD exits needs to be constructed
with sufficient integrity. One way of achieving this for UCs
is by using driving data. Further, such quantification of the
requirements from the UC not only brings meaning to the
dimensions of the ODD for the design and implementation of a
performant ADS but also reduces unnecessary safety margins.
The process of achieving a safe ADS before deployment
is discussed in Sec. II and the process of mapping a UC to
the ODD is visualised. The four strategies to ensure that the
ADS remains in its ODD are presented in Sec. III. Further, a
framework for categorising the OCs of the ODD is presented
in Sec. IV-A and how the categories can be quantified for UCs
is discussed in Sec. IV-B. In Sec. V the role of the ODD when
designing and implementing the ADS is outlined. Related
work is discussed in Sec. VI, and in Sec. VII conclusions and
potential future work are presented. To highlight the impact
of the ODD to the design process two examples of ODD
dimensions are given in Sec. IV-B1 and Sec. III-A respectively.
Further suitable strategies to ensure the OC for each example
are discussed.
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Fig. 1. A use case (UC) being quantified into internal and external operating conditions (OCs) through a world model.
The OCs of the UC are contained within the OCs of the ODD.
Fig. 2. Use cases (UCs) and
the ODD. The ADS can only
be released for UCs contained
within the ODD, i.e. not UC3.
II. THE PROCESS OF ACHIEVING A SAFE ADS
The safety of the ADS can be argued in several ways, but it
is important to consider that the main purpose is to ensure that
the released product does not expose its users or other traffic
participants to unreasonable risks. Koopman and Wagner [5]
present a validation framework that aims to do just this by
considering the residual risk at each level of testing. Junietz
et al. [6], however, note that the safety validation of ADSs
cannot be ”solved” mathematically.
Safety validation is just one aspect. Before the validation
comes the problem formulation, the HARA, the requirement
breakdown, the design, the implementation, and the verifica-
tion of the posed requirements. In this section, a potential
process to achieve a safe deployable ADS is outlined. Note that
this process would benefit from being used in conjunction with
a validation framework such as the one proposed by [5] and
potentially coupled with an analysis of the validation results
using extreme value theory [7].
The ODD helps to confine the HARA as well as the design,
development, and verification processes. However, if the ADS
is designed and verified towards an ODD it is paramount
that the ADS does not leave that ODD. For each dimension
in the ODD, there should be a strategy to ensure that this
dimension is not exceeded during operations. One prominent
and convenient way of viewing these strategies is bundling
them into a UC. This has the further advantage to clarify
the negotiation between user benefits and ADS design, as
highlighted in Sec. I-A.
In Fig. 1 the process of modelling a UC through a world
model is depicted. These pieces need to exhaustively model
the UC and to quantify what the external conditions are around
the ADS. If this model is based on a representative set of data,
it can be argued that the model itself is adequately complete.
Further, it can then be argued that the residual risk of events
not captured by the model is small enough. For example, if
the model is populated with representative data from T hours
of driving, it can be ensured that any events that would require
a change of the model have a mean time between the events
of
T¯E ≥ 2
χ2CL,2
· T, (1)
using the connection between the Poisson process arrivals and
the chi-squared distribution as discussed in [8]. (This assumes
that the events are independent and occur with exponentially
distributed times between the events.) The denominator is
the Chi-squared distribution with confidence level CL. For
CL = 75%, the factor in front of T becomes approximately
0.72. This can be used to estimate the risk that the model is
incomplete and also to quantify the incurred residual risk. Note
that in most of the modelled dimensions it will be possible
to extrapolate, which makes the model useful beyond the
collected data.
To allow the ADS to operate within a UC the ODD needs
to encapsulate all the OCs that the quantified model of the
UC requires. How this might look like for a few different
UCs simultaneously is depicted in Fig. 2. Given an ODD
the HARA can be conducted and the requirements, to fulfil
the safety goals as well as the remaining OCs of the ODD,
can be broken down and defined. These requirements together
with the requirements from strategies to ensure that ADS
remains within the ODD make up the system specification. The
ADS can subsequently be implemented and verified against
this set of requirements, as depicted in Fig. 3. Following the
ISO 26262 [2], development processes starting from the ODD
will ensure that there is a sufficiently low risk contribution
following the HARA, the requirement breakdown and the
implementation and verification.
ODD
(Operating Conditions)
Automation level
Valid in context of
Usage specification
External OCs
Internal OCs
ADS
HA&RA
SGs
Implements 
Valid 
within
Solution DomainProblem Domain
QM 
requirements
System 
specification
Valid 
within
Requirements 
from strategies to 
remain in ODD
Verified
Against
Guarantees
to stay within
Fig. 3. Depicts how the safety goals (SGs) of the HARA and the non-
safety/quality (QM) requirements are valid within the ODD and how the
requirements from the strategies to remain within the ODD ensure that the
ADS stays within the ODD. The ADS is verified towards these three classes
of requirements.
Finally, once released, the environment should be monitored
to ensure that the UC does indeed follow the estimated OCs.
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Further, the ADS should also be monitored in the field to
capture any potential violations of the safety requirements
before an event of significant loss occurs. One additional
benefit with having the field monitoring is that the models
of the UC, that used collected data, can be further verified
and refined with the added data from the field vehicles.
III. STRATEGIES FOR GUARANTEEING NOT TO EXIT ODD
As we discuss in later sections of the paper, there are
different kinds of OCs that can constitute an ODD. We need
to guarantee that the ADS feature will never experience an
ODD exit while enabled. It is thus necessary to have strategies
that are able to ensure this property for all OCs. Four such
strategies are presented in Table I. Some conditions, like
the internal having a maximum speed of 60 km/h, might be
possible to directly guarantee for the ADS as part of the basic
feature definition (strategy I), requiring no direct triggering
condition at run-time. Some external conditions can be fulfilled
by only accepting trips (strategic tasks) that beforehand can be
guaranteed to be possible to complete without exiting the ODD
(strategy II). As an example, only trips which are possible
to complete by driving on road segments that are ensured
to adhere to the ODD (i.e. UCs which are contained by the
ODD) should be accepted. If point A and B are separated by
a stretch of road that has not been characterised and ensured
to be within the ODD, this trip should not be accepted.
Some other external conditions can be guaranteed by ex-
pressing geographical or temporal triggering conditions (strat-
egy III). Many of the external OCs are connected to the UCs
which they have been estimated from. Thus, if we assume
that the UCs intended for the ADS is connected to a region,
the geographic boundaries used for triggering ODD exits
of these OCs might well be given already in the UC. In
addition to geographic boundaries there are also restrictions
in time: time of day, time of year, etc. Strategy III is closely
linked to II, which in many cases will use the same regions,
but to accept/reject a strategic task rather than triggering on
potential exits during run-time, which is the scope of strategy
III. Finally, some external conditions can be guaranteed by
dynamically measuring properties related to the OC (strategy
IV), e.g. road friction or rain. The example of rain intensity
being the OC is developed further in Sec. III-A below.
These strategies help in bridging the UC definition and the
OCs of the ODD. Recall the original example, from Sec. I-A,
where we had daytime as a restriction. Here this restriction
is reintroduced, but only as a means for ensuring that the
OCs, illumination or road characteristics, will remain within
the defined limits.
A. Example - Rain intensity
Fig. 4 shows a hypothetical frequency of rain with different
intensity as estimated for a certain UC (the distribution is made
up for the sake of this example and has no real bearing).
If we want to include the entire UC the line corresponding
to the ODD needs to be set using appropriate statistical
modelling including confidence bounds based on the data from
the UC. By acknowledging that different intensities occur with
different frequencies it is possible to provide solutions, with
different integrity, to the different cases. Alternatively, one
could do a more coarse division of the rain intensities if this
differentiation is not needed.
There are multiple reasons why one might want to restrict
the amount of rain that the ADS should be able to handle,
for example, to avoid handling aquaplaning and to ensure
sufficient perception capabilities. In addition to selecting UCs
that have a low probability of rain (strategy III), it might be
possible to devise methods to predict the future risk of high
rain intensity to make use of strategy IV. If such a method
exists, e.g. by coupling a weather forecast with a sensor,
measuring the current rain intensity, and a rain radar, it is
possible to remove these high rain intensities from the ODD.
The magenta line in Fig. 4 corresponds to the ODD where
the rain intensity is limited by a combination of strategy III,
taking care of the left part of the dashed vertical line, and IV,
ensuring that the truncation is valid.
Fig. 4. A hypothetical distribution of rain. The solid black line being the
”real” estimated distribution and the magenta one corresponding to the decided
ODD. Note the truncation at the dashed vertical line.
The ODD for the rain intensities in Fig. 4 defines what the
ADS can expect during operations and it is also against this
that the ADS needs to be designed and verified. Considering
rain on its own might result in conservative assumptions being
made with respect to other dimensions. However, if there is a
need to find a less conservative solution for the combination
of, let’s say overtaking speed and rain, then the analysis can be
expanded to take that correlation into account, as is discussed
in Sec. IV-B.
IV. CONNECTING A USE CASE TO THE ODD
When defining the strategies to avoid ODD exits in Sec. III
it was acknowledged that UCs provide a natural example of
strategy III and that it will be useful for many different OCs.
In the following section, we present a framework to categorise
the OCs of the UC to ensure that it is sufficiently modelled.
Further, the possibility of quantifying the OCs of a UC is
discussed in Sec. IV-B.
A. Categorising the Operating Conditions
Ulbrich et al. [9] present a terminology in which a UC is
defined by scenario(s), functional range, desired behaviour and
functional system boundaries. This structure is also selected
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TABLE I
STRATEGIES FOR GUARANTEEING NOT TO EXIT ODD.
Strategies
Need to estimate Need to define Need for Need for sensors
inside ODD triggering cond. reliable capable of
in design-time. for DDT-fallback map info. measuring condition
I Internal Inherent in ADS feature definition N N N N
II
External
Checking mission when accepting strategic task Y N Y N
III Statically defined, spatial and temporal triggering conditions Y Y Y N
IV Run-time measurable triggering cond. related to OC N Y N Y
as basis for the taxonomy of use case, scene, and scenario in
the ongoing standardisation work for ISO/PAS 21448 (Safety
of the intended functionality, SOTIF). As the framework is
geared towards testing and validation, and not modelling and
requirement definition, there are some changes that can be
made to make it better support the task of categorising the
OCs. In Fig. 5 the framework with our amendments is shown.
There are two main categories of OCs, the internal and the
external ones. The internal OCs are the conditions pertaining to
the ADS itself and its user. They are defined by the UC directly
or they follow from the requirements on the interaction with
the user of the ADS. For example, the speed restriction of the
ADS (which would be located in Functional Range) is likely
given by the UC definition, whereas the time for user to take
back control after a request by the ADS (located in Fallback
Ready User) can be estimated through user profiling and
usage statistics. The external conditions generally need to be
modelled and estimated. This estimation process is discussed
further in Sec. IV-B.
The aim is to make sure that the UC is sufficiently modelled.
Since we make a separation of internal and external OCs, it is
beneficial to add one level of granularity by separating other
actors and ego vehicle underneath the Actions and Events
category. Only the actions and events of other actors are
relevant for the analysis of the OCs, which is why the ego
vehicle box is greyed out in Fig. 5. It should be noted that
there will potentially be an interaction between the ego vehicle
and the actions from the other actors. However, the allowed
actions and events of the ego vehicle are captured within the
outer layer within the Functional Range rather than as part of
the scenario. Further, the Self-Representation of the different
actors present in the scene is important when simulating and
recreating test cases, but for modelling the UC it brings little
value to know the other vehicles’ own estimates of their
abilities. Thus, this box is also greyed out. The Functional
System Boundaries and the Desired Behaviour are also of no
use when modelling the OCs of the world surrounding the
ADS. The functional boundaries are proposed to be defined
by the underlying OCs of each of the other categories and the
desired behaviour will be limited by the same OCs.
In Fig. 5 the Goals and Values category has been split into
the sub-categories Permanent and Transient as discussed by
[9]. We decide to make this separation explicit in the figure to
be able to split the categories into internal and external OCs.
In addition to the original categories from [9] there is a
Fig. 5. Categories of operating conditions (OCs). Reworked based on [9]. The
greyed out boxes are not applicable as categories of OCs. Further, the OCs
are split into external and internal conditions pertaining to the environment
or the ADS itself and its user.
need to add one for the Fallback Ready User, within which
the conditions assumed/required of the user are located, e.g.
should the user be capable of resuming control of the ADS?
Does (s)he have a driver’s licence? Is the ADS a dedicated
vehicle without a user? Etc. The category of Connectivity is
also proposed to be added in order to capture the constraints
related to the availability of different connectivity-based sup-
port functions. Examples of such include global position sys-
tem (GPS), vehicle to vehicle (V2V) communication, mobile
network capabilities (such as 5G) or access to remote fleet
management systems.
The relevant categories OCs are described in Table II
together with some examples and potential data sources to
contribute to the estimation of their values within a UC.
B. Quantifying the Operating Conditions
The categories presented in Sec. IV-A all need to be
exhaustively modelled. The scenario databases proposed by
the PEGASUS project [10], as well as by TNO [11], aim
at capturing the challenges imposed by the world around the
ADS as test cases. The majority of the works cited in Sec. VI
are, along the same lines, trying to categorise the world in
order to outline the tests that the ADS should be able to handle.
These frameworks would be a good place to start in order to
populate the categories of Fig. 5. The potential sources for
estimation of the categories can differ greatly, as can be seen
from the third column of Table II, and there will consequently
be a need for different models to capture the different data.
Czarnecki [12], [13] develops an operational world model
(OWM) ontology which he argues can, at least in part, be used
for defining the ODD of an ADS. This OWM for the roads,
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TABLE II
EXAMPLES OF OPERATING CONDITIONS WITHIN EACH CATEGORY (FROM FIGURE 5) AND POTENTIAL STRATEGIES TO QUANTIFY THEM.
Category Description and examples Potential source(s) for estimation
Dynamic Elements Elements that move or are able to move. The types of such
objects, e.g.
• vehicles
• pedestrians
• emergency vehicles
and their properties, e.g.
• colour
• shape
Also including road works, including trucks, workers, etc. but
excluding stationary items like cones.
• institutional reports
• accident databases
• measurements from driving
Scenery Geo-spatially stationary elements and quasi static phenomena
• vegetation
• buildings
• road properties, e.g.
– barriers
– curvature
• weather
• map data
• institutional reports, guidelines, etc.
• measurements from driving
• historical weather data (however, global warm-
ing is expected affect the validity of the his-
torical data)
Connectivity Availability of
• GPS
• vehicle to infrastructure communications
• remote fleet management systems
• weather forecast data
• need from system implementation related to
– strategies to remain within ODD
– need for run-time information from these
sources
– satellite coverage maps
Actions & Events, Other Ac-
tors
The actions associated with the dynamic elements e.g.
• cars changing lanes
• car turning on the hazard lights
• animal crossing the road
• motorcycle driving in between lanes in a queue
• institutional reports
• accident databases
• measurements from driving
Goals & Values - Permanent
• traffic rules, laws and policies, e.g. speed limits • law texts etc.
Goals & Values - Transient
• operator input
• change of mission objectives
• user/usage mapping/profiling
Functional Range
• speed restrictions
• maximum brake allowed
• internal feature specification
Fallback Ready User
• time needed for user takeback
• capability of user to conduct takeback
• limited by usage requirements
• user mapping/profiling
as presented in [12], gives a holistic view of how to classify
as well as quantify road segments. Starting from there would
greatly help in defining the Scenery category of Fig. 5. The
OWM ontology for road users [13] lists the dynamic elements
that the ADS might be exposed to. However, their actions
are not exhaustively discussed and here we see an additional
need for developing more in-depth models, such as the one
presented by e.g. [14].
Our vision is to use models that collectively exhaust the
UC. The pieces of such a model should, on the lowest level,
capture the entirety of the UC, albeit with a granularity that
might be next to useless when constructing the ADS feature.
However, the pieces can be analysed and combined in more
elaborate formations to increase the level of granularity and
thus achieve an ADS with sufficiently low unnecessary mar-
gins. For example, assume we want to model the longitudinal
movement of other vehicles. In a simple model the parts within
this category could be braking, accelerating, and standstill.
There is no overlap between the pieces, and they can be
parameterised and quantified individually. In the first-level
analysis, these parameters will be considered independently of
any other parameters. However, in a more refined analysis, one
might find that convertible cars accelerate more aggressively,
whereas there is a higher probability of trucks to be at standstill
at the road shoulder. Thus, if there are issues with fulfilling the
OCs resulting from the initial analysis a separation could be
done to reduce the unnecessary margins for non-trucks with
respect to standstills at the road shoulder.
6
Having a world model built in such a way would create
a foundation for a requirement analysis that can be just as
granular and elaborate as needed. In the first instance, one
could assume complete independence between the pieces,
which would yield a conservative set of requirements since
the worst cases from each piece need to be combined with
each other, even though this might not at all be present in the
real world. However, the granularity of the analysis could be
increased by incorporating the correlation between the pieces
that are most limiting for the ADS. Thus, using a world model
in this way not only provides an efficient way of exhausting
the OCs of the UC in the first place, but it also provides an
efficient way of refining them when necessary.
There is significant work left to be done to compile a com-
plete set of models for the purpose of exhaustively quantifying
the UC. This is left as a suggestion for future work, but we give
two examples of what we believe could be the format of the
OCs resulting from such modelling. One has been presented
in Sec. III-A already and the second one is presented below.
1) Velocity difference during overtake: A vehicle overtak-
ing the ego-vehicle with ADS is an example of a piece of
the model for Actions and Events, Other Actors. This piece of
the model needs to be parameterised to quantify how overtakes
might occur. The velocity difference during the overtake could
be one such parameter. Note that in this granularity we do not
account for the different vehicle types that might conduct the
overtake. Thus, in the first instance of the analysis, it might
be assumed that all vehicle types (modelled in the Dynamic
Elements category) conduct overtakes in the same manner.
This analysis can subsequently be improved to model the
conditional probability or distribution for the different vehicle
types (a convertible car being, for example, more likely to
conduct an overtake than a truck).
The frequency of velocity differences between the own car
and the overtaking vehicle as measured from around 500 hours
of driving across Europe, the US and Asia is presented in
Fig. 6. From here one could make a statistical model of
the frequency distribution (including statistical confidence)
and pose the frequencies for each bin as OCs that the UC
requires. Alternatively, one could continue the analysis and, for
example, classify these events according to severity, as defined
in ISO26262 [2]. Assume that the assessed severity is for when
the own vehicle swerves into the adjacent lane. In that case, the
delta velocity can quite directly be linked to different severity
levels, as indicated in Fig. 6. The choice is now whether to
include the outcome of the severity classification as the OC or
to stick with the fine-grained histogram. The larger the bins
used, the more potentially unnecessary margins are needed.
For example, half the events of the S1 category in Fig. 6 occur
infrequently whereas the other half is quite common. However,
if it is not possible to make separate solutions within the ADS
to these different cases there is not use to make a more fine-
grained separation, because the solution needs to solve the
most limiting case anyways.
The velocity difference makes up one parameter of the
overtake within the Actions and Events category. To exhaust
Fig. 6. The frequency of measured delta velocity of overtaking vehicles
while they pass the ego car together with potential classification of severity, as
defined in ISO26262 [2], with S1 being the least severe and S3 corresponding
to a fatality. The data is from roughly 500 hours of motorway driving across
the US, Europe, and Asia.
this category there is a need for both more parameters for
overtakes, as well as more pieces to complete the model
and capture all relevant aspects. Similar to this example the
additional pieces and parameters could be estimated for a
certain UC in order to judge what is needed from the ADS.
The example of velocity differences during an overtake is
an example of an external OC that can be assured through
the third strategy Statistically defined, spatial and temporal
triggering conditions from Table I. This is possible since the
frequencies in Fig. 6 are estimated from data collected in a
geographically and temporally restricted space. As long as
the ADS remains within this space there is a high confidence
that the velocity differences that the ADS experiences during
overtakes will follow these estimated frequencies (including
the statistical modelling with confidence).
V. THE ROLE OF THE ODD
As highlighted by the example from Sec. I-A it is beneficial
if there is a clear distinction between the problem domain,
outlining what should be solved, and the solution domain,
which contains the design, requirements breakdown and sys-
tem’s solution. In making this distinction, it is necessary to
ensure that what ends up in the solution domain is confined
in such a way that it is (1) implementable and (2) verifiable.
We suggest that this is the primary purpose of the ODD, to
confine the necessary activities of the HARA as well as the
verification of the requirements and make them independent
of the specific UC considered. Fig. 3 depicts the ODD on the
boundary between the problem and solution domain and how
that relates to what needs to be done on in the solution domain.
By positioning the ODD in the border between the solution
and problem domain, the solution domain will contain two
parts to solve the requirements posed by the ODD.
(i) The part of the ADS solving the operating conditions
outlined in the ODD;
(ii) the part of the ADS ensuring that the OCs of the ODD
are not surpassed, i.e. ensuring the system remains in an
environment where the defined ODD limits are valid.
These two also correspond to the two categories of risk that
Wittman et al. [15] discuss. Strategies to fulfil the second part
are presented in Sec. III.
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One prominent and useful strategy to ensure many OCs is
UCs. It is important that the definition of the problem domain
(i.e. the ODD) completely encapsulates the UCs that the ADS
sets out to solve. Meaning that it is possible to compare a
defined ODD with a UC and argue that the UC is completely
contained within the ODD, as depicted in Fig. 2. The ADS can
consequently be designed, implemented, and verified against
the ODD rather than against the UC. Note further, that there
is no direct link between the UC and the solution domain
except that which is provided by the ODD. If the models of
the UC are correct, this means that the need for testing the
system on the roads for verification purposes is limited, as also
suggested in Sec. II. Decoupling the design and verification
of the ADS from the specific UC gives the further advantage
that the same ADS can be used for several UCs as long as
the UCs can be mapped towards the ODD of the ADS. As
an example, releasing the ADS on (a) highways in Sweden
require us to estimate the OCs of this UC. Once this is done
an ODD that encapsulates these OCs can be defined and an
ADS can be implemented according to this ODD. Further,
when implementing the ADS, it might be turn out to be easy
to design solutions for some of the operating conditions. It is
thus decided to increase the ODD and design a system that
is more capable than what is required for (a). In consecutive
development we might want to also release the ADS on (b)
highways in Germany. Again, we need to estimate what the
OCs are within this region. If it turns out that our ODD of
the already implemented ADS encapsulates the OCs of (b)
the ADS is already implemented and verified, and we can go
ahead releasing it in (b). However, if the OCs of (b) are not
encapsulated by the ODD already, there is a need to update the
ODD as well as the design, implementation, and verification
of the ADS. The independence between the ADS and its UCs
is a key feature that allows for continuous deployment and
expansion of the ADS. How to construct an ODD in relation
to the potential UCs such that they allow for modularisation
of the ADS feature itself has not been investigated further, but
is identified as future work.
Viewing the ODD as a medium to bridge the UC and the
ADS means that we suggest that geographic region is not a
direct dimension of the ODD itself, but rather
• captured as OCs within, for example the permanent goals
and values category of Fig. 5, and
• as a factor that impacts where the defined ODD is
applicable.
In this way, the ”zones” proposed as one of the main categories
in the ODD checklist presented by Thorn et al. [16] should
also be kept out of the ODD definition. Instead, each of
the implications should be contained within the proposed
categories of Fig. 5. With a holistic modelling, this should
be no issue since, for example, the interference zones (e.g.
tunnels, parking garage, limited GPS) can be captured within
the Scenery and Connectivity categories. The behaviour related
to the traffic participants would then be modelled within the
Actions and Events category.
We suggest that the ODD is quantitatively defined for all
applicable OCs. For more complex ADSs this facilitates the
comparison between the possible regions for release of the
ADS as well as during the implementation and verification
phases. Even a level 5 function, where the ADS can operate
the vehicle under all driver-manageable road conditions within
its region of the world [3], will benefit from having an
explicit ODD to express what is meant with ”all driver-
manageable conditions”. When considering ”smaller” features,
it is obviously useful to define an explicit ODD to show the
constraints of the feature. Two examples of such projects with
limited ODD in the Gothenburg region are VERA by Volvo
trucks [17] and Born to Drive [18].
The ODD can be constructed from either of two directions:
(1) from defining and quantifying a UC that the ADS should
solve and subsequently set an ODD that completely
encapsulate this UC, or
(2) by removing known challenges of the design and solution
from the ODD and then match a UC to these criteria.
In practice, the ODD will be decided using a combination
of both (1) and (2). There will be a negotiation between the
business side aiming for a large UC and the engineers of the
system focusing on finding a problem that is possible to solve
and verify. The ODD can act as the medium through which
this negotiation is made. In this light we can also view UC3
from Fig. 2 as a UC which was difficult to handle and thus we
decided to draw the ODD to exclude it. To give an example, we
might have trouble handling sun blinding the sensors during
a certain incidence angle if there is rain on the road (an OC
within the Scene category from Sec. IV-A). Knowing this we
might opt to remove this challenge from the problem domain.
The negotiation becomes a question of balancing the cost for
solving this issue versus the loss of customer value. However,
it is not possible to omit something from the ODD unless
there are strategies to ensure the ADS will never experience
it, as discussed in Sec. III. For example, restricting the feature
to only be active during the time of day (strategy III from
Table I) when the angle of the sun will not fall within the
critical interval of incidence (for a specific set or roads since
their slope will also impact the angle) could be one strategy.
Alternatively, we can devise a strategy to ensure the ADS is
only active when the road surface is dry (a combination of
strategies II to IV of Table I might suffice).
VI. RELATED WORK
The view of the ODD presented in this paper takes the
current specification from literature one step further and makes
its uses more explicit. J3016 defines the ODD as consisting
of the “Operating conditions under which a given driving
automation system or feature thereof is specifically designed to
function[...]” [3]. This is exactly what the proposed ODD is as
well, we just define the OCs such that they are more detailed
and explicit in order to facilitate the subsequent development
process steps.
It should be noted that so far, literature does not provide
a uniform definition of the ODD. The closest one gets to a
8
common standard is SAE’s recommended practice J3016 [3].
To give an example, SAE states “environmental, geographical,
and time-of-day restriction, and/or [. . . ] traffic or roadway
characteristics” as possible condition criteria. This paper sug-
gests a framework to categorise the operating conditions (OCs)
making up the ODD but does not make any claims of providing
a complete set of conditions. There are many other works
that could be used in conjunction with ours for this purpose.
Koopman and Fratrik [19] provide a comprehensive, and in
eight categories organised, list of criteria that should at least be
included in an ODD. The list includes (1) operational terrain,
(2) environment/weather, (3) operational infrastructure, (4) in-
teraction with environment, (5) geographical region (in regards
to traffic rules), (6) communication modes, (7) availability of
(map) data, and (8) expected distributions of rare elements
(e.g. toll booths). The U.S. Department of Transportation
recommends a minimum set of five items that include roadway
types, geographic areas, speed range, environmental conditions
and “other constraints” [20]. For reasons explained in Sec. V
we, however, believe that geographic region should not be a
direct ODD dimension but rather that it will impact the OCs
required of the ODD. We further believe that the structure
of Fig. 5 is able to capture all of the categories albeit in
slightly different configurations. The benefits from having one
structure for both the validation framework as well as for the
definition of the ODD we would argue turns the scales to
favour the categories based on the framework from [9] outlined
in Sec. IV-A.
A report by Thorn et al. [16], focusing on testing of ADS,
includes a chapter describing the identification of attributes
that can be used to define the ODD for an ADS. Based
on a literature survey they define and categorise the ODD
into a taxonomy with six top-levels categories; (1) Physical
infrastructure, (2) operational constraints, (3) (dynamic) ob-
jects, (4) connectivity, (5) environmental conditions and (6)
zones (i.e. geographical restrictions or special road zones like
construction zones). Each of the categories contains two to five
subcategories. Additionally, they suggest an ODD checklist
and they complete the checklist for three simplified ADS
examples. We strongly suggest that the ODD should not be
viewed as only a checklist, as this destroys the main purposes
of the ODD in facilitating the development of the ADS. The
OCs of the ODD can contribute with a detailed description of
what the ADS needs to handle, which we believe we should
use to the largest extent possible.
As part of the PEGASUS project, to provide simulation
scenarios, Bagschik et al. [21] propose a knowledge-based
ontology for defining the functional system boundaries of
an automated vehicle. They include five layers: Road, traffic
infrastructure, temporary changes to road/traffic, objects, and
environment. Wittmann et al. [15] also set out to describe the
system boundaries of an ADS. They present a specification
space with four categories: Static environment, Traffic dy-
namics, Environmental conditions, and State of ego vehicle
and passengers. They further differentiate between static and
dynamic items which define the system boundaries. It is
similar to the definition of a scene with three main categories
in [9], upon which the framework presented in Sec. IV-A is
based. Further, the state of the ADS’s passengers fits within
the Fallback Ready User of 5. Reschka et al. [22] give a list
of items that fit into the category self-representation of the
vehicle from [9]: Position accuracy, grip value, viewing area,
system operation status, and system reaction time.
All of the above frameworks capture the same information,
but in different flavours. It is clear, however, that the detailed
modelling is still left unexplored, maybe with the OWM
ontology for road structures presented by Czarnecki [12] being
the exception, as discussed before. This road ontology might
further be quantified using the hierarchical tree-structured
model with belief propagation recommended by To¨pfer et al.
[23].
Wittmann et al. [15] argue that the safety of an automated
vehicle can be assured defining a functional system boundary,
similar to how we propose to use the ODD, and a two-
part surveillance system to ensure that the boundaries are not
violated. Similar to the process proposed in this paper they
argue that scenarios can be used to set the functional system
boundary. The surveillance concept they propose does not give
room for a fallback to the user if the boundary is approached.
Additionally, neither when defining the functional system
boundary with scenarios nor when discussing the surveillance
concept, do they account for the exposure of the scenarios.
The sheer number of scenarios are of no interest to the safety
argumentation, but the risk exposure they contribute with is.
Without accounting for the exposure their surveillance concept
does not help to assess the residual risk of the ADS. Ho¨rwick
et al. [24] also suggest a function boundary monitor to ensure
that the ADS (they call it fully automated driving assistance
system) operates inside the defined functional boundaries, e.g.
by an ODD. Rather than a monitor we suggest that there
exist four generic strategies, as presented in Sec. III to ensure
that the ADS will remain in its ODD. Colwell et al. [25]
note that the ODD not only defines the restriction on the
ADS, but also defines the functional requirements for systems
responsible for ODD monitoring. The authors introduce a
restricted operational domain (ROD) which, in contrast to
the ODD, also captures a degraded functionality of the ADS.
They propose a runtime monitoring system that continuously
determines if the ADS is still acting inside the restriction of the
ROD, similar to the safety supervisor architecture proposed by
[26]. For many of the OCs, which will be required to exhaust
the categories of Fig. 5, it will not be possible to make such
a restriction, for others it will be highly tractable. Thus, the
ROD should be considered when continuing the work with
detailing the dimensions of the framework presented in this
paper.
It is clear from the plethora of ODD definitions that there is
plenty of work left to align on a complete list of dimensions
to exhaust the framework presented in this paper. Further, it
is also evident that there exist several visions of what the
purpose(s) of the ODD should be. We hope that this paper
sheds some light on this and shows the potential the ODD has
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when designing and developing an ADS.
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
The operational design domain (ODD) of an automated
driving system (ADS) aims to confine where the ADS is
valid and restrict the scope of the safety case as well as the
verification efforts. To ensure that the ADS never experience
an ODD exit while activated we present a set of four strategies
for the ADS to remain in its ODD and examples highlighting
the use of the strategies are given. It is acknowledged that use
cases (UCs) provide a convenient strategy for a collection of
OCs. A framework to categorise the OCs of a UC is presented
and how the OCs can be quantified is discussed. Writing the
ODD using these same OCs further facilitate the mapping
between different UCs towards the ODD. Since using the ODD
to model the UC makes the ADS independent of the specific
UC the ODD supports both continuous deployment of the ADS
features as well as to accommodate a wide variety of ADS
variants. Additionally, having the ODD on the proposed format
makes it modular and generalisable across multiple UCs.
Detailed models of each of the OCs, within the categories
presented in this paper, is suggested for future work. Further,
analysing the impact of the proposed strategies to the ADS
architecture is an important next step. Additionally, investigat-
ing the modularisation of the ADS itself and how that relates
to potentially different UCs or ODDs is another interesting
avenue for future work.
VIII. LIST OF ACRONYMS
ADS automated driving system (fulfilling SAE
automation levels 3-5)
DDT dynamic driving task
HARA hazard analysis and risk assessment [2]
OC operating condition
ODD operational design domain
OWM operational world model [12], [13]
ROD restricted operational domain [25]
UC use case
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